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REDISTRICTING: Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234
(2001): Race-Based Redistricting and Unequal
Protection
WADE L. JACKSON*
INTRODUCTION
In Easley v. Cromartie,' the United States Supreme Court put an end to a nearly
decade-long battle over North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District.2 This bitter
litigation began shortly after the district was redrawn following the 1990 decennial
census.3 In that decade of litigation, the Supreme Court reversed lower court
decisions four times,4 three by a five-to-four vote. 5
In the final suit, analyzed herein, the Court held that the U.S. District Court's
finding that race, rather than politics, had been the predominant factor in drawing
the district was clearly erroneous, and therefore reversed.6 In doing so, the decision
created a new test for plaintiffs who challenge redistricting plans7 and signaled a
shift in the direction the substantive law of redistricting had been traveling in the
previous decade.
This Casenote will describe the background and procedural history of the Easley
decision, analyze its reasoning, and explain its implications generally and for New
Mexico in particular following the resolution of this state's redistricting process,
some of which took place in court. It will describe how the Court ignored its role as
an appellate court to undertake its own fact finding; how the Court, upon doing so,
either mistook or ignored the bulk of the evidence; how the Court went about

* Class of 2003, University of New Mexico School of Law. The author would like to acknowledge with
sincere gratitude and heartfelt thanks several people without whom this Note would not have been possible: Pat
Rogers, Esq.; Duncan Scott, Esq.; Mickey Barnett, Esq.; Sen. Rod Adair; Rep. Joe Thompson, Esq.; Jay McCleskey;
and Steve Plante. Their assistance, advice, and example were indispensable, but nothing when compared to their
friendship.
1. 532 U.S. 234 (2001). Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 35.3, Governor Michael F. Easley was substituted
as a party defendant for former Governor James B. Hunt, Jr., upon the former's inauguration in January 2001. The
case name was therefore changed from Hunt v. Cromartie to Easley v. Cromartie.
2. See infra Statement of the Case.
3. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D. N.C. 1992), was filed less than two months after the first
challenged redistricting plan, the second plan enacted by the legislature, was enacted by the North Carolina General
Assembly on January 24, 1992. The first plan enacted by the legislature failed to receive necessary pre-clearance
of the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division. Id. at 463. See also Letter from John R. Dunne,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorney General, State of
North Carolina (Dec. 18, 1991).
Jurisdictions are placed under Department ofJustice supervision for violations of the Voting Rights Act's
prohibition on racial discrimination in voting practices. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1982). The redistricting process is
deemed a voting practice for the purposes of the Act. Id. Such jurisdictions must submit redistricting plans to the
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice before they are enacted into law. Id.
The Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division and his staff will then examine the plan
for legal defects such as racial discrimination and either grant pre-clearance, in which case the plan may be enacted
into law, or interpose official objection, in which case the legislature must remedy the defects before the plan can
become law. Id. The grant of Department of Justice pre-clearance does not, however, serve to insulate a redistricting
plan from legal challenges. Id. See also infra note 49.
4. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U.S. 899 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
5. Easley, 532 U.S. at 234; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 899; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 630.
6. Easley, 532 U.S. at 237.
7. Id. at 258.
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making new law in derogation of its Equal Protections jurisprudence; and how
Justice O'Connor changed positions on this issue and thereby determined the
outcome of this case. Finally, it will describe how the Court shirked its duty to act
as the legal system's moral compass and set this nation's race relations back a
generation.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Census and Redistricting
Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution mandates that the House of
Representatives be apportioned according to population and that each state have at
least one representative. 8 The Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce
conducts a nationwide census every ten years, and the 385 popularly apportioned
congressional seats must be reapportioned among the states according to population
shifts that have occurred in the previous decade.9 Reapportionment refers to the
division of these seats among the states according to population and is often used
in place of the term "redistricting."' 0
Both congressional and state legislative districts must be redrawn to account for
population shifts." With rare exceptions, the number of seats in a state legislature
does not change, and those seats are therefore not reapportioned, but merely
redrawn.' 2 Redistricting refers to the process of drawing the geographic boundaries
of the new districts following the census, be they congressional, legislative, or those
of some other body. 3 Only after congressional seats have been reapportioned among
the states do the states begin the process of redistricting. 14 But, by the same token,
until the districts are redrawn, the process of reapportionment is not completed. 5
Numerous considerations, including many political factors, go into redistricting
decisions. These decisions, whether made by legislatures or redistricting
commissions,"6 often determine the fate of legislators' political futures, and can, and
indeed have, ended political careers altogether."' Redistricting is arguably the single

8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.

9. There are 435 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. 2 U.S.C.

§2c. Each of the fifty states

is given

one seat and the remaining 385 are apportioned according to population. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
10. See 2 U.S.C. § 2a (differentiating between "reapportionment" and "redistricting").
11. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
12. New Mexico, like most states, has constitutional provisions defining the number of seats in each house
of its legislature. N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 3. Those numbers may therefore be changed only by constitutional

amendment. Id.
13.
14.
15.

See 2 U.S.C. § 2a (differentiating between "reapportionment" and "redistricting").
2 U.S.C. § 2c.
See id.

16. At present, the task of redistricting still falls to the legislature in the majority of states, including New
Mexico. N.M. CONST. art. IV,§ 3. However, several states have created redistricting commissions, with far fewer
members, to undertake the redrawing of districts. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, Part 2, § 3; CONN. CONST. art. 3,
§ 6; N.J. CONST. art. I1, § 2.
17. Republican Sen. Steve Stoddard, a resident of Los Alamos, represented that entire county prior to the
1990 redistricting. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-8B-1 to 2-8B-51 (repealed 1992). The Democrat-controlled legislature
redrew the Senate districts so that Los Alamos, previously represented by a single, majority-Republican district,
was divided among three majority-Democrat districts, in none of which could a Republican be elected. 1991 Senate
Redistricting Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-8C-1 to 2-8C-49.
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most politically heated and contentious issue that state legislatures face; however,
it is a power that legislatures guard closely. Following the ratification of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 8 which stripped state legislatures of the power to elect
U.S. Senators and mandated their popular election statewide, redistricting remains
a check against federal power by giving state legislatures a voice in the election of
members of Congress.
Redistricting is governed by a long and complex history of case law, 9 as well as
several general requirements for legislative districts.20 First, districts must be of
equal population. 2 The purpose of redrawing districts is, after all, to account for
population shifts in the previous decade and to ensure that each district represents
an equal number of people according to the census.
The first principle a newly-drawn district must meet, equal population,22 has
different definitions in different contexts.23 The Supreme Court has held that the
requirement that congressional districts must be of equal population "as nearly as

18. The Seventeenth Amendment was ratified in 1913 as a plank of the Progressive Movement. See, e.g.,
Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR.
L.REv. 1007, 1015 (1994).
19. See, e.g., Lawyer v. Dept. of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Reno
v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (plurality opinion); Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
(1986); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
20. Federal courts have long considered redistricting criteria to be state, not federal, policy choices and have
refused to establish any constitutional standards regarding contiguity, compactness, communities of interest,
jurisdictional integrity, cores of existing districts, or incumbent protection. See Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68
(D. Colo. 1982). The requirement that districts be of equal population is the exception. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18.
21. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8 ("We hold that, construed in its historical context, the command of Art. i, §
2 [of the United States Constitution), that Representatives be chosen 'by the People of the several States' means that
as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's.").
The population of districts in different states may differ, due to differences in total population among
the states; however, each district in a single state must be of equal population. Id. at 8. Following the 2000 Census,
the ideal population of New Mexico's congressional districts was 606,349. Census 2000. See also infra note 29.
22. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8.
23. This first, seemingly simple, requirement raises one of the more complex and controversial issues in
political demography. The equal population requirement to which districts are held is measured by the total
population of the district. Id. at 18.
Other measures are used, however, in other contexts. For example, with regard to the requirement of not
diluting the voting strength of a racial or ethnic minority, many minority groups will argue that they will not be able
to elect the minority candidate of their choice unless a majority of its voting-age population, or sixty-five percent
of its total population, is minority. See infra note 280; United Jewish Org., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 152 (1977);
see generally Dr. Henry Flores, Ph.D., Between a Rock and a HardPlace: Texas Latinos andRedistricting in 2001,
6 TEx. Hisp. J.L. & POL'Y 137, 144 (2001).
This difference between the two measures highlights the difference between representational equality
and electoral equality. Districts must be of equal population to ensure electoral equality, that every person's vote
is of the same weight as every other's. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18. Drawing districts with an equal voting-age
population would ensure electoral equality.
Even those constituents who do not vote must still be represented, however, and must be given a voice
in the representative branch of government through their elected legislator. For example, no one would argue that
children should not be represented by their congressperson or state legislator, but no one younger than eighteen is
allowed to vote. See Jane Rutherford, One Child, One Vote: Proxiesfor Parents, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1463 (1998).
For this reason, districts must be of equal population, as measured by the district's total population, to ensure
representational equality, that every person, regardless of age or whether or not they vote, is represented equally
in the state or national legislative body. Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 774-75 (1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1028 (1991); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560-61.
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practicable"'24 means that if any population deviance could have been avoided

through a good-faith effort to do so, it is unjustifiable.25 In other words, equal means
equal, and most congressional districts vary by less than the population of a single
precinct, usually not more than a few hundred people.26
State legislative districts are held to a different standard, 27 usually defined by the
state itself.28 New Mexico's relatively sparse population is spread across one of the
nation's largest states, making equal population a nearly impossible goal without
districts of unmanageable size and unwieldy shape. As such, New Mexico's
legislative districts must be within five percent of the ideal population of a district.29
This also keeps communities of interest intact rather than being split to achieve
popular equality.3"
Second, districts must be contiguous." A district cannot be made up of more than
one separate piece. One must be able to trace the outline of a district without lifting

the pencil from the paper.

Third, districts must be compact.32 Ideally, a district should be a circle, rectangle,
or similarly simple geometric shape. It should not contain arms that stretch across
many miles, as did the infamous Gerrymander itself." Many rural districts, however,

24. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8. See also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577 ("IT]he Equal Protection Clause requires
that a state make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of
equal population as practicable.").
25. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
26. See Jepsen v. Vigil-Giron, No. D-101-CV-200102177 (2001). The district varying most from the ideal
population in the court-ordered plan for New Mexico's congressional districts is the Third, which is 109 people
smaller than the ideal population. Id. The First District is fifty-one people larger than the ideal population. Id. The
Second District is fifty-seven people larger than the ideal population. Id.
27. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 316 (1973) ("Thus, whereas population alone has been the sole criterion of
constitutionality in congressional redistricting under Art. I, § 2 [of the United States Constitution], broader latitude
has been afforded the States under the Equal Protection Clause in state legislative redistricting because of the
considerations enumerated in Reynolds v. Sims.").
28. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); and Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 316 (1973), have established a three-tier analysis for the deviation of legislative districts.
Generally, districts that deviate from the ideal population of a district by less that ten percent do not establish a
prima facie case without evidence that such deviation has caused invidious discrimination. White, 412 U.S. at 763.
Deviations under 16.4 percent present a prima facie case that must be justified by the state but have been upheld
when supported by a rational state policy. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 742; Mahan 4 10 U.S. at 328. Only two such policies
have been recognized by the Court: the preservation of political subdivision lines, Mahan, 410 U.S. at 325, and the
"political fairness" doctrine articulated in Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 743. Deviations of more than 16.4 percent have not
been upheld by the Court.
29. 2001 N.M. Laws ch. 220. The ideal population of a district is calculated by dividing the total population
of a state by the number of districts into which it is to be divided. The maximum deviation of a redistricting plan
refers to the absolute sum of the deviations from the population of the ideal district of the largest and smallest
districts in that plan.
30. See infra pages 507-08.
31. No federal authority, either statutory or case law, exists for the contiguity requirement. See Carstens v.
Lamm, 543 F.Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1982); see also supra note 20. It is, however, almost universally imposed by the
state undertaking the redistricting task. See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 906. It is also considered one of the traditional,
race-neutral districting principles against which Equal Protection violations are measured. Easley v. Cromartie, 532
U.S. 234, 258 (2001).
32. No federal authority, either statutory or case law, exists for the compactness requirement. See Carstens
v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1982); see also supra note 20. It is, however, considered one of the traditional,
race-neutral districting principles against which Equal Protection violations are measured. Easley v. Cromartie, 532
U.S. 234, 258 (2001); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 954 (1996).
33. After representing Massachusetts in the first two congresses, statesman Elbridge Gerry (1744-1814) was
elected governor of that state. See generally 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA, 701-02 (2001). In 1812, during his
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must reach into urban areas to pick up population in order to meet the equal
population requirement, causing districts to take on non-compact shapes. Districts
also take on strange shapes because voting precincts have strange shapes. Precincts,
however, are drawn by county officials, not state legislatures.' While there
are
measures of compactness, generally complex mathematical formulae, there
is no
bright line legal test of whether a district is compact.
Finally, districts should respect communities of interest.35 Districts, whether
congressional or legislative, should keep together communities that share racial,
ethnic, cultural, economic, social or other characteristics.3 6 This often includes
respecting other political boundaries, such as county lines and local school
board
boundaries, which is sometimes recognized as a separate criteria in and of itself.37
While generally recognized as a redistricting requirement," nearly anything can
be
defined as a community of interest. This concept can include two contradictory
communities," such as rural voters, which would
include both the archconservative oil and gas and cattle ranching groups on New Mexico's east side
as
well as the reliably Democratic Native American areas in the northwestern
"checkerboard" part of the state. Racial and ethnic groups
can also be said to belong
to a single community of interest deserving of a legislative district, even when
drawing a legislative district for those communities might constitute a
racial
gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection clause39 or create a district
that
does not comply with equal population requirements.'
Several of these criteria will at times be contradictory. For example, states have
protected incumbent legislators and maintained political balance, relying on respect
for communities and jurisdictional lines in an attempt to explain their failure to
draw
compact or contiguous districts."

second term, his party, the Democratic-Repubficans, re-drew the state's congressional
districts to maintain control
of the state's delegation, employing tactics known today as gerrymandering. Id.
The most unusual of these districts resembled, at least to the political cartoonist
of the Boston Weekly
Messenger, a salamander. Id. The cartoonist added hands, feet and a head to a drawing
of the district, and combined
its creator's name, Gerry, with the animal it represented, a salamander, to create
the caption "The Gerry-mander."
Id. Gerry lost his next re-election bid but was elected Vice President of the United
States in James Madison's second
administration. Id.
34. Interview with Hon. Rod Adair, New Mexico State Senator (R-33)
and President, New Mexico
Demographic Research, in Albuquerque, N.M. (Feb. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Adair
Interview].
35. Respect for communities of interest is considered one of the traditional, race-neutral
districting principles
against which Equal Protection violations are measured. Easley v. Cromartie, 532
U.S. 234,258 (2001); Miller,515
U.S. at 916.
36. See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 547 (1999); Abrams v. Johnson,
521 U.S. 74, 100 (1997);
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 972, 977 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 938 (1996);
Miller, 515 U.S. at 919 (1995).
39. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 900.
40. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
41. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997);
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952 (1996).

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 32

In addition to these requirements, prior to its Special Session on redistricting, 42
the New Mexico State Legislature imposed additional requirements on the districts
it would draw. 43 All legislative districts were to be single-member districts,"4 and no
district was to split a precinct.45
This is to say nothing of the political measures that are considered at every step
of the process. Each district is analyzed for both voter registration and voter
performance, and the better part of the debate over redistricting plans inevitably
focuses on a district's voter performance.46 As the Supreme Court noted in the
Easley decision, voter registration is a poor indicator of voter performance, of which
there are several measures.47
Redistricting requirements with regard to race are even more complex. For
example, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 196548 states that new districts
cannot dilute the voting strength of racial, ethnic, or language minorities. 49 That

42. The New Mexico Legislature, a part-time "citizen legislature," meets in regular session for thirty days
in even-numbered years and for sixty days in odd-numbered years. N.M. CONST. art.
IV, § 5 A. The thirty-day
sessions are dedicated solely to the budget and those additional matters that the governor approves in advance. N.M.
CONST. art.
IV, § 5 B. When necessary, the Legislature will convene special sessions to address extraordinary topics,
including redistricting. N.M. CONST. art.
IV, § 6.
43. 2001 N.M. Laws ch. 220.
44. Id. As its name implies, a single-member district is one represented by only one legislator. Conversely,
muli-member districts are represented by more than one member. For example, Arizona's lower house has twice
as many members as its upper house, and two house districts are "nested" in each senate district. See ARIZ. CONST.
art.
IV, part 2, § 1. In other words, two house districts are drawn within a single senate district, dividing its
population equally, and together have the same outer boundary as the senate district. Id. The two house members
together represent the entire senate district, making the senate district a multi-member house district. Id.
45. 2001 N.M. Laws ch. 220.
46. Voter performance analyzes past election returns in order to predict future elections. Adair Interview,
supra note 34. Different pollsters and demographers will use different formulae, which weight certain elections in
greater or lesser proportion based upon a number of factors, including voter interest and the quantity of information
voters receive on candidates. Id. Voter performance and voter behavior, the term used in the Supreme Court's
opinion, will be used interchangeably in this Casenote.
47. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 244 (2001).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
49. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act only applies to covered jurisdictions. See supra note 3. It requires
that such jurisdictions be granted permission from either the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, in
the form of pre-clearance from the Assistant Attorney General for the Division, or the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia, in the form of a declaratory judgment, to enact the proposed redistricting plan. 42 U.S.C. §
1973(c). In either case, the supervising authority must declare that, in its judgment, the submitted redistricting plan
"does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color" or language minority. Id.
Because seeking pre-clearance from the Department of Justice is not a substitute for seeking a de novo
proceeding in the district court and because it is generally faster and less expensive than doing so, most covered
jurisdictions choose to seek pre-clearance. Following the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973, the burden of proof in both the district court and before the Department of Justice is that the jurisdiction
must show that redistricting plans do not retrogress the voting strength of racial, ethnic, or language minorities.
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997).
Section 2, on the other hand, applies to the entire country. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. The 1982 amendments to
the Voting Rights Act were "designed to restore the legal standard that governed voting discrimination cases prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in [City of Mobile v.]
Bolden [,446 U.S. 55 (1980)]." S.Rep. No. 97-417 at 15
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177. In Bolden, the Court decided that plaintiffs in constitutional vote
dilution cases had to prove discriminatory intent. 466 U.S. at 66-67. This burden was often impossible to meet and
severely limited the number of Section 2 challenges to redistricting plans following the 1980 census.
In 1982, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to prohibit any "voting qualification or prerequisite
to voting standard, practice, or procedure... which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color...."
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (emphasis added).
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requirement must now be balanced with the requirement that race not be the
predominant factor in drawing the district."0 Put another way, race may, and
sometimes must, be considered when drawing a district but may not subordinate
traditional race-neutral districting principles, including those discussed above.
New Mexico History
The history of redistricting in New Mexico is short and uninvolved compared to
other states, particularly those in the South. A single congressman represented New
Mexico until 1942."' After the state received its second district, as a result of the
1940 Census, the two congressmen served at large. 2
It was not until 1968, when the state finally began enforcing the Supreme Court's
decision in Baker v. Carr,53 that the state's members of Congress were elected from
single-member districts.' New Mexico was granted its third congressional district
following the 1980 Census.55 In each of the three redistricting efforts prior to the
current battle, Democrats controlled both houses of the state legislature and there
was not only a Democratic governor, but the same Democratic governor: Bruce
56
King.
Following the 1980 Census, a group of Hispanic plaintiffs successfully
challenged the legislative redistricting, alleging racial discrimination and the dilution
of their voting strength. 57 The United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico redrew portions of the redistricting plan itself to remedy the defects.58 As
a result, New Mexico was placed under Department of Justice supervision for the
1990 redistricting, meaning any plan passed by the legislature and signed by the
governor must also be granted pre-clearance by the Department of Justice pursuant
to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act5 9 before it was enacted.'
In 1991, the Department of Justice granted pre-clearance to the state house's
redistricting plan but interposed an official objection to the state senate plan.6' The
legislature then met twice more in special session before agreeing to a plan that
62
cured the Department of Justice's objections and was granted pre-clearance.

50. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (plurality opinion); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). See also
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 1002-1003 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
51. Congressional Quarterly, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY's GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS, 930 (3d ed. 1994).
52. Id. at 1201-56.
53. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that a complaint alleging a violation of Equal Protection based upon
malapportionment did not present a nonjusticiable political question).
54. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra note 51, at 1261.
55. Id. at 930.
56. While New Mexico prohibits the same governor from serving more than two consecutive terms, there
is no limit to the total number of terms one may serve. N.M. CONST. art. 5, § 1, ci. 2.
57. Sanchez v. King, 550 F. Supp. 13 (D. N.M. 1982).
58. Id.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c).
60. See supra notes 3, 49, and accompanying t~xt.
61. Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to Sen. Manny Aragon,
President Pro Tem, and Rep. Raymond Sanchez, Speaker, State of New Mexico (Dec. 10, 1991).
62. 1991 Senate Redistricting Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-8C-I to -49.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1990, the Census Bureau of the United States Department of Commerce
conducted its decennial census. North Carolina was awarded a twelfth congressional
district as a result of its increased population throughout the previous decade, which
was reflected in the Census. 63 After the reapportionment, the North Carolina General
Assembly met to redistrict the state's congressional and legislative districts, as each
state must do following each decennial census.'
North Carolina's legislature passed a redistricting plan that included one district
with a voting-age population that was majority-African-American. 65 Due to its
history of voting qualifications and prerequisites, North Carolina was required to
of Justice pre-clearance before enacting any redistricting
obtain Department
legislation.' s
The Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division interposed an
objection to the plan,67 pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,68 however,
because the plan "appear[ed] to minimize minority voting strength" in the
southeastern part of the state and "chose not to give effect to black and NativeAmerican voting strength" in that area.69 The Assistant Attorney General's objection
letter implied that a second majority-minority district should have been created.7"
In response to its failure to obtain the requisite pre-clearance from the Department
of Justice, the General Assembly enacted a second redistricting plan. The new plan
created a majority-African-American Twelfth Congressional District, but the district
was not in the southeastern part of the state, as suggested. It was instead drawn as
"a thin band, sometimes no wider that Interstate Highway 85, some 160 miles long,
snaking diagonally across piedmont North Carolina from Durham to Gastonia."'"
The new ?lan divided precincts, counties, and towns among two and three different
districts.
Anglo citizens and registered voters of Durham County filed suit for deprivation
of their civil rights 73 against the U.S. Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney
General for the Civil Rights Division, and various state officials and agencies. 74 The
suit challenged the congressional redistricting plan adopted by the State on
constitutional and statutory grounds and sought a preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order enjoining the state from "taking any action in

63. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 463.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 42 U.S.C. 1973(c). See also supra notes 3, 49, and accompanying text.
67. As an expression of his refusal to grant a plan pre-clearance, see supra notes 3 and 49, the Assistant
Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division interposes an official objection to the plan to the appropriate state
legislative officials. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c).
69. Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, to Tiare B. Smiley,
Special Deputy Attorney General, State of North Carolina (Dec. 18, 1991).
70. Id.
71. Shaw v. Barr,808 F. Supp. at 464.
72. Id.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
74. Shaw v. Barr,808 F. Supp at 461-62.
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preparation for primary or general elections for the U.S. House of
Representatives. 75 It also sought a permanent injunction against implementation of
the plan on the ground that it was unconstitutional.76
The federal defendants moved to dismiss the claim, 77 alleging lack of subject
matter jurisdiction 8 and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.79
The State defendants moved to dismiss the claim, ° alleging failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.8" The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina met as a three-judge panel to hear the case. 2 The
court, over a dissent, dismissed the suit against the federal defendants for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted.83
The court held that Section 14(b) of the Voting Rights Act s' grants exclusive
jurisdiction over a claim such as this one to the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. 5 The court further held that a challenge to Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act86 involves a challenge to the Attorney General's discretionary
87
power, and as such the suit failed to state a cognizable federal claim.
The trial court, again over a dissent, further dismissed the suit against the state
defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.88 The
court held that the plaintiff's claim, as the trial court construed it, was "a novel claim
in voting rights jurisprudence.. .and we decline to recognize the individual right
asserted under it." 89
The suit was appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court."° The Supreme Court,
by a five-to-four vote, affirmed the dismissal of the suit against the federal
defendants9 but reversed the dismissal of the suit against the state defendants.92 The
Court held that North Carolina's congressional redistricting legislation, particularly
the shape of the Twelfth Congressional District, was so extremely irregular on its
face that it could rationally be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for
voting purposes.93 Having drawn such a district without regard to traditional
districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification was sufficient

75.

Id.

76. Id. at 463.
77. Id.
78. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(1).

79. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
80. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 463.
81. FED. R. Cv. P. 12(b)(6).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 requires a three-judge district court to be convened for any suit challenging the
constitutionality of a redistricting plan. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 allows for direct appeal to the Supreme Court of any suit
required to be heard by a three-judge district court.
83. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 467.

84. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
85. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 466.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
87. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 467.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 468.
Id.
See supra note 82.
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993).
Id. at 642.
Id. at 649.
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to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
On remand, the three-judge district court found for the defendants.9" The court,
with one judge concurring in part and dissenting in part, held that the plaintiffs had
standing to maintain their Equal Protection claim.' It further held that the plan
deliberately included one or more districts of a certain racial composition, making
it a racial gerrymander, which, under the Court's ruling in Shaw v. Reno,97 is subject
to strict scrutiny. 98
Nonetheless, the court found that the defendant state of North Carolina had a
compelling interest in enacting a plan that brought its congressional redistricting
scheme into compliance with the Voting Rights Act 9 and would therefore be given
pre-clearance by the Department of Justice and passed into law."r The court also
found that the challenged redistricting plan was narrowly tailored to serve its
compelling interest. To wit, the plan did not create more majority-minority districts
than were required to bring the plan into compliance with the Voting Rights Act,'
allowing it to be granted pre-clearance, 0 2 and the African-American voting
majorities in those districts were no greater than reasonably necessary to give the
African-American communities an opportunity to elect the representatives of their
choice.'0 3 The plan therefore survived strict scrutiny. 4
The plaintiffs again appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court,0" and the Court
again reversed by a five-to-four vote."6 The Court held that while voters who lived
in an allegedly gerrymandered district did have'standing to challenge the part of the
redistricting scheme that defined the district in which they lived, voters who did not
live in the challenged district and could not demonstrate that they had been assigned
to the district in which they lived on the basis of race did not have standing."°
More significantly, the Court held that the challenged redistricting plan violated
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.0 8 The Court did not
reach the issue of whether complying with the Voting Rights Act was indeed a
compelling state interest. The Court found, however, that "creating an additional
majority-black district was not required under a correct reading of [Section] 5 and
that District 12, as drawn, is not a remedy narrowly tailored to the State's professed

94. Id.
95. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp 408, 417 (E.D. N.C. 1994).
96. id. at 425.
97. 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding a suit alleging that North Carolina's redistricting plan was so extremely
irregular on its face that it could rationally be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for the purposes of
voting was sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
98. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 429.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
100. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 437.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
102. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 475.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 82.
106. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
107. Id. at 904.
108. Id. at 902.
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interest in avoiding [Section] 2 liability."' 9 The plan therefore failed the strict
scrutiny test and violated the Equal Protection clause." 0
Following the Supreme Court's ruling, the North Carolina General Assembly
enacted a new redistricting plan. The three-judge District Court approved of the plan
as a remedy for the previous constitutional violation."' The new Twelfth
Congressional District was again challenged as an unconstitutional racial
gerrymander by two of the original three plaintiffs along with four other residents
12
of the new Twelfth Congressional District."
The three-judge District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment at a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction." 3 The
court therefore granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction and a
permanent injunction, enjoining the defendants from conducting any elections under
the new redistricting plan.'.
Based presumably on the expertise it had gained in the previous litigation, the
court quickly found "uncontroverted material facts" that the legislature had drawn
the Twelfth District by collecting voting precincts with high racial, rather than
political, identification by bypassing more heavily Democratic precincts to include
more heavily African-American ones.' ' In doing so, the court found that the
legislature had disregarded traditional districting criteria." 6 The court then denied
the defendant's motion to stay its order." 7
The District Court issued a scheduling order requiring the General Assembly to
either submit a new congressional redistricting plan to the court and to the
Department of Justice for Section 5 pre-clearance within one month or the court
would assume responsibility for drawing an interim plan."' The legislature
submitted a new redistricting plan, under which North Carolina conducted its 1998
congressional elections with the district court's approval.'9 The plan included a
clause to the effect that, in the event the challenged plan was upheld on appeal to the
Supreme Court, it would become law and the new plan would be null and void. 120
Upon direct appeal of the district court's grant of summary judgment, the
Supreme Court reversed.' 2 ' The Court held that genuine issues of material fact
existed, making summary judgment improper, and remanded for trial.122 On remand,
the three-judge district court, with one judge concurring in part and dissenting in

109. ld. at 911.
110. Id.

111. Shaw v. Hunt, No. 92-202-Civ-5-BR (E.D. N.C. June 9, 1997).
112. Cromartie v. Hunt, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1029 (E.D. N.C. 1998).
113. Id.
114. Id.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
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Cromartie v. Hunt, 4:96-CV-104-BO(3) (E.D. N.C. 1998).
Id.
Cromarie v. Hunt, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1030.
Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 407, 410 (E.D. N.C. 2000).
1998 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 2 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-201(a) (Supp. 1998)).
Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 410.
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
Id. at 552.
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part, held that the First Congressional District was acceptable despite being adjusted
to ensure that African-Americans were a slight majority.' 23
The court found that the Twelfth Congressional District, however, had been
racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 24 The court held that race had been the predominant reason for the
26
creation of the Twelfth District,'25 requiring strict scrutiny to be applied.' The
district was not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest, however, and was
therefore an unconstitutional violation of Equal Protection.'27
RATIONALE
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, reversed. It held that the district
court's finding that race, rather than politics, was the predominant criterion in
creating the Twelfth Congressional District was clearly erroneous. 2 Accordingly,
due to a clause inserted in the 1998 redistricting plan that the North Carolina
General Assembly submitted to the three-judge District Court as a remedy to the
constitutional violations found in the 1992 redistricting plan, the 1998 plan, put in
place for the 1998 congressional elections, was null and void, and the 1997 plan was
reinstated. 2 9
The Court held that it "cannot accept the District Court's findings as adequate,"' 3 °
and that the findings were therefore clearly erroneous. The Court listed four
instances of error'' and then analyzed each in detail.'3 2
First, the Court found the district court had used voter registration rather than
voting behavior as its primary evidence for its conclusion that race was the
predominant factor in drawing the district."' That evidence, the Court held, was
inadequate to support the district court's findings.'34 The district court had found
that in drawing the district the legislature had included the heavily AfricanAmerican precincts but excluded many heavily Democratic precincts that had a
higher Anglo population.' 35 Many of these heavily Democratic precincts bordered
the district and if included would have created a much more compact district.'3 6 The
Supreme Court found, however, that the district court had used voter registration,
as opposed to voting behavior, to determine that these precincts were "heavily

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 423.
Id. at 420.
Id.
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993).
Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 420.
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001).
Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 410.
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 244.
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Id. at 244-57.
Id. at 244.
Id.
Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 420.
Id.

Summer 2002]

REDISTRICTING

Democratic."'' 37 The Court held, "we previously found the same evidence inadequate
because registration figures do not accurately predict preference at the polls."'' 38
Second, the district court had relied on the testimony of the plaintiff-appelee's
expert, Dr. Ronald Weber of the University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee,
whose
statements "simply do not provide significant additional support for the District
Court's conclusion."' 39 The Court then analyzed the testimony of Dr. Weber
and
deternined that it provided, at best, only "minimal support for the District Court's
conclusion that race predominantly underlay the legislature's districting decision." 4
°
Dr. Weber testified that the legislature made the Twelfth District more
safely
Democratic than it intended or needed by including heavily African-American
precincts. 4 ' The Court rejected that argument, stating that the performance numbers
Dr. Weber spoke of were "inherently uncertain"'4 2 and the voting performance
greater than that necessary to constitute a safe district was therefore "too small
to
carry significant evidentiary weight."' 43
The Court then took issue with Dr. Weber's testimony that District Twelve
included only some precincts with a high Democratic performance but nearly
all
precincts with an equally high percentage of African-Americans.'4 The Court
wrote
that the same precincts with a large African-American population, the precincts
included in the district, were the most reliably Democratic precincts. 145 The
Court
reasoned that including those precincts could have been done for political, not
racial,
reasons. 4 6 The Court also questioned the district court's reliance on Dr. Weber's
contention that a particular precinct in Mecklenburg County was split between
47
districts for racial reasons. 1
Finally, the Court accepted Dr. Weber's assertion, on which the district court
relied, that the legislature could have created a safe Democratic district without
including so many majority-African-American precincts. 48 However, the
Court
questioned whether these alternatives would have "satisfied the legislature's
other
nonracial political goals" while adhering to traditional districting principles. 49
Without such proof, the Court reasoned, alternative plans were not evidence
of
improper, race-based motive. 50
The Court then went beyond the district court's opinion to examine the
trial
transcript of Dr. Weber' s testimony in depth. It found that, as a whole, his testimony
"further undercut Dr. Weber's conclusions.'' For example, Dr. Weber
was

137. Easley v. Cromartie,532 U.S. at 244-45.
138. Id. at 245.
139. Id. at 244.
140. Id. at 250.

141. Id. at 246.
142. Id. at 247.

143. Id.
144. Id. at 247-48.
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147. Id. at 248.

148. Id. at 249.
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working under the incorrect impression that the legislature's map-drawing
a "disdain" for
computers provided racial but not political data.'52 He also expressed
53
the process by which legislatures redistrict congressional seats.1
Third, the Court found that the district court summarily rejected the conclusions
of the defendant-appellant's expert, Dr. David Peterson of the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, without rejecting the factual information he provided in
support of his conclusions."M Those conclusions were contrary to those of Dr.
Weber, upon which the district court had relied in making its decision.'5 5 Dr.
Peterson first testified that African-American Democrats were more reliably
Democratic voters than other voters registered as Democrats.' 56 He then examined
the precincts on both sides of the district's border and determined that the boundary
was drawn based on politics, not race. 57 The Court clearly gave more weight to Dr.
Peterson's testimony than did the district court.' 5 s
Fourth, the Court found that the district court had relied on two pieces of direct
evidence that supported its conclusion.5 9 The Supreme Court, however, discredited
one, the testimony of a state senator before a legislative committee that the
challenged plan satisfied a "need for 'racial and partisan' balance."' 60 The Court
found that the statement showed only that the legislature considered race along with
other factors. 16' The second piece, an e-mail from the legislative staff member
responsible for drafting districting plans to two state senators referencing moving
District, was found to offer "some
the "Greensboro Black community into the 12th"
62
support for the District Court's conclusion."'
The Court then detailed several maps appended to the plaintiff-appellee's brief,
which it argued showed support for the district court's conclusion.163 The Court
then, one-by-one, discredited the precinct changes suggested by the plaintiffappellee to draw a more compact, less African-American district without harming
the political goals of the legislature." The Court found these maps refuted the
conclusion that race, rather than politics, had been the predominant factor in creating
the district.'65
Finally, the Court established a new test for cases "such as this one where
majority-minority districts (or the approximate equivalent) are at issue and where
racial identification correlates highly with political affiliation."'" In such cases, the
Court held that the "party attacking the legislatively drawn boundaries must show

152. Id. at 249-50.
153. Id. at 250.
154. Id. at 244.
155. Id. at 251.
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at the least that the legislature could have achieved its legitimate political objectives
in alternative ways that are comparably consistent with traditional districting
principles. That party must also show that those districting alternatives would have
brought about significantly greater racial balance."' 67
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court committed four errors in deciding Easley. The first was
procedural. The Court failed to properly apply the clearly erroneous standard of
review and undertook its own fact-finding. The second was substantive. The Court
ignored indisputable evidence of a predominantly racial motive. The third was
jurisprudential. The Court overruled controlling precedent, reversed the trend of
redistricting case law, and carved out an exception to Equal Protection standards
without basis in the Constitution or Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. The
fourth was political. The Easley majority included Justice O'Connor, who had voted
for all of the decisions overruled here and had written several of the opinions. Each
error will be examined in detail.
1.
The Court's first error was procedural. The proper standard of review was clearly
erroneous.' 68 The Court failed to correctly apply that standard. Instead of reviewing
the district court's decision for clear error, the Court performed its own fact-finding.
It overturned factual determinations to which it should have deferred and reversed
a decision it should have affirmed.
A.
The Court stated at the outset of its analysis that "[t]he issue in this case is
evidentiary. We must determine whether there is adequate support for the district
court's key findings, particularly the ultimate finding that the legislature's motive
was predominantly racial, not political."' 69 The Court cites no authority for this
proposition, likely because it is an inaccurate statement of the Court's role.
One of the first descriptions a law student hears of an appellate court's function
is that it is a court of review, not redo. That description, while superficial, is largely
accurate. Appellate courts do not retry cases because they do not have the authority
to do so. That is particularly true when an appellate court reviews a trial court's
findings of fact. Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury... [flindings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge of the credibility of the witnesses.' 0
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That rule has been held, and is now commonly understood, to mean that "[a]
finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed."'' However,
[tihis standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding
of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the
case differently. The reviewing court oversteps the bounds of its duty under Rule
52(a) if it undertakes to duplicate the role of the lower court.'72
That overstepping is precisely what the Supreme Court did in this case. The
clearly erroneous standard was the one to be applied here, and the trial court's
decision could only be overturned if its findings of fact were found to be clearly
erroneous. The Court cites the two cases thought to be definitive of that standard,
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.' and Anderson v. City of Bessemer
City,174 but disregards the latter's discussion of the issue.
Two of the four bases for the district court's finding were its reliance on the
plaintiff-appellee's expert, Dr. Weber, and its rejection of the conclusions of the
defendant-appellant's expert, Dr. Peterson. Weighing the testimony and determining
the credibility of witnesses is, however, the role of the trial court. As the Anderson
Court wrote,
when a trial judge's finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of
one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially
plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not
internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error. 175
The Court not only chose to reverse largely because it would have decided the
case differently but ignored the direction of the one case decided nearly forty years
after the second. In Anderson, the Court determined that "[w]here there are two
permissible views of
the evidence, the factfinder' s choice between them cannot be
176
clearly erroneous."'
The Court emphasized that this case was heard on direct appeal to the Supreme
Court, 171without the benefit of intermediate review.178 As apparent justification for
failing to properly apply the clearly erroneous standard, the Court elaborated that the
trial of the case was "not lengthy," that the evidence was "primarily of documents
179
and expert testimony," and that "credibility evaluations played a minor role."'
That argument is without authority and without merit. Courts of appeals regularly
apply the clearly erroneous standard to cases they review on appeal. There is no
reason that the first appellate court to hear a case cannot properly apply the
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appropriate legal standard. And, as Justice Thomas pointed out in dissent, the lack
of an intermediate appellate court would certainly have been mentioned in prior
redistricting cases if it were truly a factor in the standard of review.8 °
The relevance of the trial being "not lengthy"'' is unclear, but there is no legal
support for the argument that a shorter trial entitles the appellate court to undertake
its own fact-finding enterprise. The same is true of trials in which the evidence is
"primarily of documents and expert testimony,"' 82 and Rule
52(a) itself states,
"findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
' 83
aside unless clearly erroneous.'
Finally, the Court disregarded the magnitude of the role credibility evaluations
played. The basis of the Court's opinion is the choice of one expert witness over
another. The Court spent ten pages of its opinion sifting through the trial court's
record in great detail." Had the Court believed the same expert witness the district
court had, the case would have been decided the other way. Credibility evaluations
were central to the Court's decision, and its failure to recognize this is inexplicable.
Moreover, Bose v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.,5 the very case
the Court cites as support for "an extensive review of the District Court's
findings,"'8 6 held that "the likelihood that the appellate court will rely on the
presumptions [of the correctness of factual findings] tends to increase when trial
judges have lived with the controversy for weeks or months instead of just a few
hours."' 87 The Court's reliance on Bose is therefore clearly misplaced. Such a
holding should weigh in favor of affirmance, as the trial court not only "lived with
the controversy"' 8 through the three-day trial during which hundreds of pages of
expert and statistical analysis were presented, but one member of the three-judge
panel had presided over suits challenging this congressional district for the past ten
89
years. 1
B.
In the district court, defendant-appellant's expert Dr. Peterson testified that
African-American Democrats were more reliably Democrat voters than were other
voters registered as Democrats. "gThe district court found that testimony unreliable
and not relevant.' 9 ' The Supreme Court listed this finding as error.'92
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181. Id. at 243.
182. Id.
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In making its finding, the district court relied on the testimony of the plaintiffappellee's expert, Dr. Weber, that Dr. Peterson's analysis was unreliable because it
"ignored the core"' 93 of the district as it previously existed and that it failed "to take
account of the fact that different precincts have different populations."' 94 Dr. Weber,
one of the nation's foremost redistricting experts, 95 was found by the trial court to
be credible, and it relied upon his testimony.'96 Dr. Peterson, who had never before
testified in a redistricting case and used a methodology never before employed in
the redistricting context, was deemed to be unreliable. 97
The Supreme Court examined Dr. Peterson's testimony, as well as Dr. Weber's
criticism thereof, and determined that the district court's reliance on the latter and
rejection of the former was in error." 8 In doing so, the Court ignored its role as a
reviewing court and engaged in the sort of credibility determination that is reserved
for the trial court. The Court found that "differences in the racial and political
makeup of the precincts just inside and outside the boundaries of District 12 show
that politics is as good an explanation as is race for the district's boundaries."199
Dr. Weber testified, however, that politics was not as good an explanation as race
for the district's boundaries, °° and the district court relied on that testimony. 2°' That
is its role. The trial court is charged with making factual determinations that cannot
be overturned unless clearly erroneous, and, as the dissent pointed out, "[wihere
there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between

them cannot be clearly erroneous.

,202

C.
The argument has been made that the Court applied the clear error standard in an
unusual fashion because this was an unusual case.20 3 In reversing the trial court, the
argument goes, the Supreme Court loosened the ordinarily strict clearly erroneous
standard not to apply constitutional standards, whether new or existing, to the
redistricting plan but to protect the power of the state legislature to redraw its state's
congressional districts.
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In previous cases, the Court has stated in no uncertain terms that redistricting is
the province of state government.2" The Court made no mention of this in its Easley
opinion, however, and certainly does not offer it as a rationale for eviscerating the
clearly erroneous standard. There is no statement to the effect that this is the sort of
extraordinary case in which the standard of review should be less deferential, or that
the case was decided as it was to protect the state legislature's authority to redraw
its congressional districts.
Moreover, Justices Scalia and Thomas, the Justices who most often take an
absolutist position with regard to separation of powers and federalism, dissented in
this case.2 5 Had the Court truly decided as it did to protect the state legislature's
authority, Federalist Society' member Justice Scalia would have taken the
opportunity
to put to use his "anachronistically formal view of the separation of
207
powers.

It.

The Court's second error was substantive. The Court either misunderstood or
ignored much of the plaintiff-appellees' evidence of the predominantly racial motive
in drawing the Twelfth Congressional District, which was clearly sufficient to
support the trial court's judgment.
A.
The Court found that, having been based primarily on voter registration data
instead of voter performance data, the district court's findings were inadequate to
support its decision.20 8 The Court, however, misconstrued both the plaintiffappellee's and the lower court's use of those figures, despite the plaintiff-appellees
explaining the importance of voter registration figures in this case clearly and in
detail.2 °9
North Carolina's party primary elections are open only to registered voters of that
party and to voters registered as Independents. 1 ° Candidates can win a primary
election with a plurality of forty percent of the vote.2" Plaintiff-appellee's expert
witness, Dr. Weber, whose testimony was so lightly regarded by the Court,2 '2
testified that the inclusion of majority-African-American precincts had made the

204. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993) ("Absent evidence that these state branches willfail timely
to perform that duty, a federal court must neither affirmatively obstruct state reapportionment nor permit federal
litigation to be used to impede it."). See also Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407
(1965).
205. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 259.
206. The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy is a non-partisan organization interested in the current
state of legal order. It is founded on the principles that the state exists to preserve freedom, that the separation of
governmental powers is central to the Constitution, and that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary

to say what the law is, not what it should be. The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy, available at
http://www.fed-soc.org/.
207. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 602 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).

208. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 244.
209. See Plaintiff-Appellee.s Brief at 26, Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (200 1)(Nos. 99-1864,99-1865).

210. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-59 (1999).
211. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-111 (1999).
212. See supra Rationale.
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Twelfth District more Democratic than necessary to ensure the election of a
Democratic congressperson.2 3
The gravamen of that testimony was that the district had been gerrymandered so
that African-Americans made up more than sixty percent of the registered
Democrats in the district.214 If the African-American community made up less than
sixty percent, a candidate with unified Anglo support could win in an election
against two African-American candidates who split the vote of the AfricanAmerican community." 5 When the African-American community made up more
than sixty percent of the registered Democrats in the district, it could elect the
candidate of its choice, so long as it voted as a bloc. 2 6 The African-American
community would therefore control the Democratic primary election, and, because
the district is so highly Democratic, the general election as well.
The trial court understood and relied upon this testimony in making its
decision. 217 Dr. Weber uncovered the legislature's motive when Dr. Peterson, a
redistricting novice, could not. The Court, upon reviewing a cold record, apparently
got as far as the words "voter registration" and skipped to the next section, because
it missed the point entirely. Nowhere in its opinion does the Court mention why
voter registration figures were used or that these figures indicated a racial motive for
drawing the district. The opinion stated only that voter registration was inadequate
to predict voter performance,2 8 which is true but not at all relevant.
The second piece of direct evidence considered by the district court was likewise
all but ignored by the Supreme Court, but together with the plaintiff-appellee's
presentation of voter registration data carried all the drama of a smoking gun. That
evidence was an e-mail message from Gerry Cohen, the draftsman of redistricting
plans during the legislative session, to two Democratic senators.2 9 One of the
recipients was the chairman of the Senate Redistricting Committee. The other
recipient was a private voting rights attorney who in 1992, when the Twelfth District
was originally drawn, was practicing in the same Charlotte firm as Mel Watt, the
Congressman who has represented the Twelfth District since its creation. The e-mail
read, "I have moved the Greensboro Black community into the 12th.... "22O Upon
considering that evidence, the Court concluded, "It does not discuss why
Greensboro's African-American voters were placed in the 12th District; it does not
discuss the political consequences of failing to do so.... "22
The e-mail itself did not discuss the consequences, but Dr. Weber did. Had the
Court's majority attended the trial or read the entire transcript, it might have noticed
that by moving the "Greensboro Black community" into the Twelfth District the
percentage of registered Democrats who were African American rose from 52.5

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 246.
Id.
See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
There were only 773 voters registered as Independents in the district. Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 28.
Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 419-20.
Easley v. Cromartie,532 U.S. at 244.
Id. at 254.
Id.
Id.
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percent to 60.5 percent, enough to control the primary election.222 This also explains
why majority-Anglo precincts with a high Democratic registration were excluded
from the district. Their inclusion would have diluted the percentage of registered
Democrats who were African-American, thereby destroying the African-American
community's control of the district's election.
The voter registration figures, considered "inadequate ' 223by the Court, along with
the e-mail message, which was found "less persuasive than the kinds of direct
evidence we have found significant in other redistricting cases,"224
'
provide
indisputable evidence of a racial motive in creating the district as it was drawn. Any
evidence of a racial motive is sufficient in this case to find that race was the
predominant factor in drawing the district when one considers that there was no
political reason for drawing it at all.225 It had been decided early in the legislative
session that the only possible means of reaching a compromise on a redistricting
plan for the state's congressional districts was to maintain the existing partisan split
among the delegation of six Democrats and six Republicans. 226 In other words, the
Twelfth District needed to be a Democrat district that included incumbent Mel
Watt's residence, and nothing more.
B.
In rejecting Dr. Weber's criticism of Dr. Peterson's testimony, and ignoring its
role as a reviewing court by making a credibility determination itself,227 the Court
stated that Dr. Weber's testimony that Dr. Peterson's analysis ignored the core of
the existing district "apparently reflects Dr. Weber's view that in context the fact
that District 12's heart or 'core' is heavily African-American by itself shows that the
legislature's motive was predominantly racial, not political."228
'
Dr. Weber's
testimony reflects no such thing and in making that assertion the Court revealed its
own motive in finding error in the analysis. The Court was so caught up in
discrediting Dr. Weber's testimony that it wrongly defined the term "core."
Preserving the core of existing districts is one of the race-neutral districting
criterion to which redistricting plans must adhere, and political demographers
charged with creating redistricting plans produce "core retention studies" to
222. North Carolina maintains a database of voter registration records by both party and race.
N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 163-82.4 (2001). The percentage is determined by an equation in which the number
of African-American
registered voters in the Twelfth District is multiplied by the rate at which African-Americans
register as Democrats,
in this case ninety-five percent. Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 27 n.24 (citing Defendant-Appellant
State of North
Carolina's J.A. at 589). That number is divided by the number of voters permitted to vote
in the primary election,
namely all voters registered as either Democrats or Independents. Id. (citing Defendant-Appellant
State of North
Carolina's J.A. at 17).
Using election data from the first election following the enactment of the 1997 redistricting
plan, the
number of registered African-American voters in the district (126,488) was multiplied by the
rate at which AfricanAmericans register as Democrats in North Carolina, (ninety-five percent). Id. (citing Defendant-Appejant
Stale of
North Carolina's J.S. App. 79a). That number, 120,164, is divided by the sum of the number
of voters in the district
registered either as Democrats, 197,783, or Independents, 773, or 198,556. Id The quotient
is 60.5 percent.
223. Easley v. Cromarie, 532 U.S. at 245.
224. Id. at 254.
225. See also infra Analysis, part IIC.
226. Easley v. Cromartie,532 U.S. at 239-40, 246-47.
227. See supra Rationale.
228. Easley v. Cromartie,532 U.S. at 251.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

accompany new maps and determine how much of an existing district is retained in
a new one.229 The core of a district refers to the geographic and population centers
and would therefore include demographic factors such as race, but the Court's
assumption that by "core" Dr. Weber meant racial core is incorrect.
The appellants themselves argued that politics, namely incumbent protection, had
been the predominant factor in drawing the Twelfth District, and "[t]his was done
in part by preserving the constituent and partisan core of each district. ' 23 ° The
district court, having litigation over this district before it for the better part of a
decade, was well versed in the substantive law of redistricting and correctly
determined
that any new redistricting plan must respect the core of existing
231
districts.

When Dr. Weber, one of the nation's foremost experts on redistricting,232 testified
that the analysis done by Dr. Peterson, who had never before testified in a
redistricting case and used a methodology never before employed in a redistricting
context, ignored the core of existing districts, the district court understood that
analysis, the terms used therein, and the reason why they were significant.233 The
district court knew that districting plans must respect the core of existing districts
and understood the justification for that race-neutral districting requirement.234 The
Court held that "[t]he District Court did not argue that the racial makeup of a
district's 'core' is critical. 235 But it is the Supreme Court that has crafted the law of
redistricting, and the Supreme Court that has held that respecting the core of an
existing district is one of the traditional race-neutral districting principles.236
C.
For all it did say, the Court's opinion is as remarkable for what it did not say.
Neither the district court nor the Supreme Court addressed the most obvious point
in support of upholding the lower court's decision, and it was not argued by either
party. Had politics, as opposed to race, truly been the predominant factor in drawing
the Twelfth District, race need never have been considered at all. While it is true, as
the Court stated, that voting behavior figures are, to a certain extent, "inherently
uncertain, 237 that is only true because most demographers do not extend their
analyses to sufficient lengths to ensure greater certainty as doing so would take
inordinate amounts of time and effort. Determining voter performance does not
involve complex mathematical formulae; it requires simple arithmetic. Predicting
future voter performance is nothing more than analyzing past voter performance.23 8

229. Adair Interview, supra note 34.
230. Defendant-Appellant State of North Carolina's Brief on the Merits at 2, 22, Easley v. Cromartie, 532
U.S. 234 (2001) (Nos. 99-1864, 99-1865).
231. See Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 419-420.
232. See supra note 195.
233. Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 419-20.
234. Id. at 420.
235. Easley v. Cromartie,532 U.S. at 251.
236. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 84 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
237. Easley v. Cromartie,532 U.S. at 247.
238. See supra note 46.
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Demographers, regardless of what the Court may believe, are perfectly able to
analyze election returns and predict how each and every precinct in a particular state
is going to vote for a particular candidate for a particular office. To do so, one must
only add together the votes cast in past elections, giving more or less weight to
certain contests based upon their desirability in predicting the race in question, and
then divide by the number of elections added.239 However a particular demographer
might decide to average the votes of a particular precinct, and there is any number
of ways to do so, race is not a consideration.
What's more, North Carolina only received its twelfth district after the 1990
Census. Prior to that time, it did not exist. Therefore, there was no minority
population in the district, so that minority population could not have been diluted.
In other words, compliance with non-retrogression principles required by the Voting
Rights Act, 24° essentially the only reason to consider race at all, was not a factor.
That being the case, there is no justification for using race as a factor in any way in
creating the Twelfth District.
The Court also made no mention of North Carolina's party primary system or the
argument, which was briefed extensively 24' and argued orally before the Court,242
that race was clearly the predominant factor in creating the Twelfth District because
the district was drawn in such a manner as to guarantee an African-American would
win the Democratic primary election, and, due to the partisan composition of the
district, the general election as well.243
The Court never addressed the fact that the Twelfth District was drawn to be just
less than majority-minority so that it would not present a prima facie racial
gerrymander, despite the trial court pointing out that "using a computer to achieve
a district that is just under fifty-percent minority is no less a predominant use of race
than using it to achieve a district that is just over fifty-percent minority."' It also
failed to acknowledge that the plan at issue in this case included 90.2 percent of the
African-American population of the 1992 plan, struck down as an unconstitutional
racial gerrymander,245 but only 48.8 percent of the Anglo population. 6

239. For example, a high-energy, charismatic candidate with good name recognition running for a high-profile
office, such as the U.S. House or Senate, might reflect how a similar candidate would perform in a similar race.

Adair Interview, supra note 34. However, that race would not be an accurate reflection of how an unknown, lowprofile candidate would perform in what is known as a "low-information race," one about which the voters receive
little information, have little knowledge, and express little interest, such as state court of appeals judge. Id. A mix
of low- and high-information races at the national, statewide, and local levels can easily be averaged, adding a
certain race more or fewer times depending on the candidate for whom one wants to predict performance, to provide

any number of predictions about a certain precinct's performance. Id. The low-information race returns, for

example, could be added twice to each high-information race, lessening the performance expectations of the

candidate and providing a more realistic prediction of performance. Demographers generally include only those
races decided by a certain number of percentage points, thereby rejecting any landslide elections that would
contaminate the sample. Id. Using only low-information races is a good indication of how an "average" candidate

will perform, as it more closely reflects the purely partisan preferences of a precinct or district, and the more

elections that are added to the average, the more accurate that prediction will be. Id.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
241. Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 27.

242. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33-35.
243.
244.
245.
246.

See supra Analysis, part I1 A.
Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 420.
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 902.
Plaintiff-Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at 4.
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The Court also did not discuss the 1998 plan,247 passed after the district court
granted these plaintiffs summary judgment 248 and under which that year's
congressional elections were held.24 9 The "legitimate political objectives '25 ° of that
plan were the same as those of the 1997 plan. 25 ' The Twelfth District in the 1998
plan, however, divided fewer counties than the 1997 plan's Twelfth District,
included a far more compact Twelfth District than the 1997 plan, and its AfricanAmerican population was only thirty-six percent, compared to the forty-seven
percent of the 1997 plan.23 2 In other words, the 1998 plan, which was in place at the
time of the Easley decision, met all the requirements of the new Easley test: it
"achieved [the legislature's] legitimate political objectives, 253 adhered to
"traditional redistricting principles," 254 and "brought about significantly greater
racial balance." 255 However, the 1998 plan was replaced with the 1997 plan.
D.
The Court found that "the primary evidence upon which the district court relied
for its 'race, not politics' conclusion is evidence of voting registration, not voting
behavior," and that doing so was in error.256 Yet, a mere two pages later the Court
field such as voting behavior, where figures are inherently
wrote, "[i]n a The
uncertain ....
,,257 voter registration figures were not used as a substitute for voter
performance but as direct evidence of the racial motive in drawing the Twelfth
District, as discussed above.
In any case, there is no question that voter registration numbers are poor
indicators of voting performance or that there are more accurate methods of
measuring voting performance itself without regard for party registration.258
However, there are as many different formulas for calculating voting behavior as
there are demographers and pollsters, and, as the Court readily admitted, their
accuracy leaves something to be desired. But was it clearly erroneous for the district
court not to rely on figures that are inherently uncertain as its primary evidence?
Furthermore, after declaring that voter registration is inadequate to predict
preference at the polls, the Court stated, "In part this is because white voters
registered as Democrats cross-over [sic] to vote for a Republican candidate more
often than do African-Americans, who register and vote Democratic between ninetyfive [percent] and ninety-seven [percent] of the time., 259 After stating that voter
registration is "inadequate" to "predict preference at the polls ''2 ° and that voting

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

See supra notes 119, 120 and accompanying text.
Cromartie v. Hunt, 34 F. Supp. 2d. at 1029.
1998 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 2 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-201(a) (Supp. 1998)).
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 258.
See Appellants Exhibit 146 (1998 § 5 submission to the Department of Justice).
Id. See also Plaintiff-Appellees' Petition for Rehearing at 5.
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 258.
Id. See also supra Historical Background.
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 258.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 247.
See supra notes 46, 239 and accompanying text.
Easley v. Cromartie,532 U.S. at 245.
Id. at 244.
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behavior statistics are "inherently uncertain,, 261 the Court saw fit to cite actual
figures of both registration and performance as evidence that the district court was
clearly erroneous."'
As backward as that logic may be, it goes unnoticed for several readings due to
the gist of the sentence in which it is found. The Court, in declaring a lower court
to be in error, stated that Anglo voters "cross-over [sic] to vote for a Republican
candidate more often than do African-Americans. 263 That sentence is based on one
of three assumptions: Anglo voters registered as Democrats will sooner vote for an
Anglo Republican than an African-American Democrat, implying the very racism
the district court sought to prevent with this decision; African-American voters are
too stupid to evaluate candidates for political office based upon their merits and will
vote for any candidate with a "D" beside his or her name, practicing the very racism
it implies with the first assumption; or African-American voters will vote only for
African-American candidates and that there are not any African-American
Republicans, implying a point "too absurd to be contemplated, and I shall
contemplate it no further." 2"
In his dissent, Justice Thomas made the point clearly:
However, the District Court was assigned the task of determining whether, not
why, race predominated. As I see it, this inquiry is sufficient to answer the
constitutional question because racial gerrymandering offends the Constitution
whether the motivation is malicious or benign. It is not a defense that the
legislature merely may have drawn the district based on the stereotype that
blacks are reliable Democratic voters.265
The question of which of the Court's assumptions is more insulting, a question
that will be left to the reader, is overshadowed by the implications of the Court's
argument. It is undisputed that the North Carolina legislature could not have drawn
districts that included or excluded African-American citizens because they were
African-American. The Court, however, had no problem with the legislature
drawing districts that include or exclude African-Americans because they "are
reliable Democratic voters." 26
Never mind that that reasoning is precisely the use of race as a proxy that is
prohibited by redistricting case law. 267 By that logic, employers could refuse to hire
African-Americans if they did so not because the applicants were African-American
but because they were more likely to steal from the employer.26

261. Id. at 247.
262. Id. at 24547.
263. Id. at 245.
264. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 342 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
265. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 266-67 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
266. Id.
267. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 968. Cf Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,410 (1991) ("Race cannot be a proxy
for determining juror bias or competence.").
268. In 2000, African-Americans made up 12.3 percent of the nation's total population. Census 2000.
However, in 2000, African-Americans made up 28.4 percent of those arrested for burglary, 30.4 percent of those
arrested for larceny, and 53.9 percent of those arrested for robbery. 2000 Uniform Crime Statistics, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Department of Justice (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Justice Statistics, 2000). In 1996,
African-Americans made up thirty-nine percent of those convicted in state courts for all property offenses, thirty-six
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In his dissenting opinion in Bush v. Vera,2 9 Justice Stevens, who joined the
Court's opinion in the present case, wrote, "I note that in most contexts racial
classifications are invidious because they are irrational .... It is neither irrational, nor
invidious, however, to assume that a black resident of a particular community is a
Democrat if reliable statistical evidence discloses that 97 [percent] of the blacks in
that community vote in Democratic primary elections.' 27 °
Never mind that the Democratic primary elections in the community in question
in this case are not limited to voters registered as Democrats."' Assuming that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's own crime statistics are "reliable statistical
'
evidence,"272
Justice Stevens would apparently agree, as the Court's argument
shows, that it would be "neither irrational, nor invidious '' 211 to assume that an
African-American is more likely to steal than other people. Such an assumption
would support an employer's decision not to hire an African-American, as it is
"reliable statistical evidence., 274 Can it be that the Fourteenth Amendment,
following this decision, reads, "No state shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws unless 'reliable statistical evidence'
leads it to believe that the denial of such equal protection would be neither irrational
nor invidious"?
The substantive law of redistricting is well established and very involved. That
of Equal Protection is even more so. It is difficult to imagine that the Court did not
realize its decision here would have an impact beyond this case but harder still to
imagine that they intended the consequences of its opinion. The Court clearly did
not contemplate the implications of its rationale in reaching its decision, evidence
that it determined the outcome of this appeal before applying its rationale to reach
a conclusion.
If.
The Court's third error was jurisprudential. It overruled controlling precedent,
reversed the trend of redistricting cases, and carved out an exception to Equal
Protection standards without basis in the Constitution or Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence.

percent of those convicted of burglary, thirty-eight percent of those convicted of fraud, forgery, or embezzlement,
and forty-one percent of those convicted of auto theft. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Felony Sentences in State Courts, 1996 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Justice, 1999) at 5, tbl.5. In 1997,
African-Americans made up 14.8 percent of those sentenced in federal district courts for burglary or breaking and
entering, 17.8 percent of those sentenced for auto theft, 28.7 percent of those sentenced for fraud, and 35.7 percent
of those sentenced for larceny. U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1997 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics
(Washington, D.C., U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1998) at 14-15.
269. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
270. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 1031 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
271. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
272. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 1031 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
273. Id.
274. Id.
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A.

Beyond deciding the fate of North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District, the
Court established a new test for "case[s] such as this one where majority-minority
districts (or the approximate equivalent) are at issue and where racial identification
correlates highly with political affiliation... ,"275 The new test the Court announced
creates serious practical difficulties. First, to which plans does it apply? While the
term majority-minority seems self-explanatory, there is great debate over its precise
definition.27 6
Moreover, Anglos are often numerical minorities in their states or political
subdivisions, and racial and ethnic diversity will only become greater in the
future.277 It is already the case in New Mexico that no single racial or ethnic group
makes up a majority of the state's population.278 As previously discussed, different
groups in different contexts will use total population, voting-age population,
registered voters, or other measures to calculate whether a particular minority makes
up a majority in a particular district.279 Some groups, including advocates for
Hispanic and Native Americans in New Mexico, argue that, for many reasons, a
district must be sixty-five percent minority to give that minority group the
opportunity to elect the representative of its choice.280
Even if one is able to determine the definition of a majority-minority district,
what is its "approximate equivalent"? If the term majority-minority may be stretched
to include nearly any district with a high percentage of minority population, does
"approximate" mean that the percentage must not actually be greater than
fifty? The
answer is obviously yes because the district challenged in this case was not
majority-African-American, yet the Court applied its newly created test nonetheless.
In the next decade, the number of districts that could be argued to be the
"approximate equivalent 28 of a majority-minority district will likely
outnumber
those that could not.
More important are the actual requirements of the new test. The Court held that
the party challenging the redistricting plan must show that "the legislature could
have achieved its legitimate political objectives in alternative ways that are
comparably consistent with traditional districting principles. That party must also

275. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 258.
276. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. There has, at least, come to be an accepted definition of
"minority." As used in the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and in this Note, the term refers
to any non-Anglo
racial, ethnic, or language group. The analogous term for "Anglo" used by demographers and in racial redistricting
figures is "non-Hispanic white."
277. See infra Implications.
278. Id.
279. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
280. Only a portion of that sixty-five percent of the population are citizens who are eligible to vote, reducing
the minority community's ability to elect the candidate of its choice. Adair Interview, supra note 34. Of those who
are, only a portion will be of voting age, further undercutting the minority community's political power. Id. Only
a portion of that population will actually be registered to vote. Id. The ability to elect the candidate of choice is
further reduced by any number of sociological factors, including an absence of minority candidates, a perceived
inattention to minority issues, and simple apathy toward the political process. Id.
281. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 258.
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show that those districting alternatives would have brought about significantly
greater racial balance. ' 82
While those requirements seem straightforward, the Court established them in a
case in which one of the parties challenging North Carolina's congressional
redistricting plans did exactly that. The plaintiffs in Easley employed one of the
283
most authoritative and well respected redistricting experts in the nation. He
testified that the North Carolina General Assembly had subordinated traditional,
race-neutral districting principles to race itself, and that race, rather than politics,
had been the predominant factor in drawing the districts. 2' He showed that the
Twelfth Congressional District included precincts with higher percentages of
African-American population while bypassing precincts with equal or greater
that were registered and voted Democratic and were
percentages of population
285
closer to the district.
As Dr. Weber testified, the legislature, therefore, could have achieved its
legitimate political objective, namely maintaining the existing partisan balance in
the congressional delegation, by including precincts with lower percentages of
African-American population that were closer to the district, thereby adhering to the
traditional districting principle of compactness and bringing about "significantly
of
greater racial balance. 28 6 The district also would have adhered to the principles
27
interest.
of
communities
true
for
respect
and
contiguity,
equal population,
The Court itself recognized that these requirements were met. It wrote,
The District Court's final citation is to Dr. Weber's assertion that there are other
ways in which the legislature could have created a safely Democratic district
without placing so many primarily African-American districts within District 12.
And we recognize that some such other ways might exist. But, unless the
evidence also shows that these hypothetical alternative districts would have
better satisfied the legislature's other nonracial political goals as well as
traditional nonracial districting principles, this fact alone cannot show an
improper legislative motive. 88
Creating a safe Democrat district that protected the incumbent was the
legislature's "nonracial political goal.""2 9 Plans that, for example, paired incumbent
members of Congress in the same district would have been rejected out of hand. Dr.
Weber's "hypothetical alternative districts"2' did no such thing. What they did do,
as the Court itself admits, was make the Twelfth District safely Democrat, meeting
"the legislature's other nonracial political goals."'" They did so "without placing
' meaning they
so many primarily African-American districts within District 12, 292

282. Id.
283. See supra note 195.
284. Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
285.

Id.

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Easley v. Cromarie, 532 U.S. at 258.
Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
Id. at 249 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 249. See also Appellant's Exhibit 146 (1998 § 5 submission to the Department of Justice).
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 249.
Id.
Id.
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"would have brought about significantly greater racial
balance., 29 3 And they met,
as any district drawn by a redistricting expert with Dr. Weber's
expertise and
experience would, "traditional nonracial districting principles. 294
In fact, Dr.
Weber's districts were not only "comparably consistent 29 5 with those
principles but
were more compact than the Twelfth District, which "connects communities
not
joined in a congressional district, other than in the unconstitutional
1992 Plan, since
the whole of Western North Carolina was one district, nearly two
hundred years
'
ago. "296

In other words, Dr. Weber's "hypothetical alternative districts ' 297
met each and
every requirement of the test the Court announced in Easley.298 The
Court found,
however, that they did not "provide evidence of a politically practical
alternative
plan that the legislature failed to adopt predominantly for racial reasons."2 99
If one
of the nation's pre-eminent redistricting experts supplying exactly
the alternative
methods the new tests demands was not sufficient evidence to meet
the burden now
applied, what would be? And the Court was surprised that Dr. Weber
testified,
"sometimes expressing disdain for" the legislative redistricting process.3
The Court, in creating its new test, failed to define "legitimate
political
objectives.""'' For example, iselecting an African-American representative
a
legitimate objective? Is re-electing the incumbent, who was originally
elected from
an unconstitutionally racially gerrymandered district, legitimate?3 °2
If either
above is legitimate, then no alterative proposed by any plaintiff challenging of the
such a
district that adheres to traditional, race-neutral districting principles
could
possibly
achieve those objectives. 33 The Court also failed to state when those
"legitimate
political objectives"" must have been established. Any redistricting
defended legally and justified politically if the legislature that passedplan could be
it is able to
define its objectives post hoc. They will simply be tailored to the plan
or district in
question, selecting some legitimate, race-neutral objective that
applies to the
completed plan, no matter how irrelevant it may have been in the actual
drawing of
the districts.

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. at 258.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 258.
Cromartie v. Hunt, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
Easley v. Cromartie,532 U.S. at 249.
Id. at 258. The same is true of the North Carolina General Assembly's
1998 plan. See supra notes 119,
120 and accompanying text.
299. Easley v. Cromartie,532 U.S. at 249.
300. Id. at 250.
301. Id.at 258.
302. See id. at 263 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (answering this question
in the negative).
303. By adhering to the traditional, race-neutral districting principles,
the district would obviously not meet
these "legitimate" political objectives because the objectives are race-based.
Similarly, it would be impossible for
any plan offered by a party challenging a districting scheme with ','legitimate"
political objectives such as these to
bring about significantly greater racial balance, again because the objectives
are race-based and by definition are
seeking to bring about the very opposite of racial balance.
304. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 258.
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B.
Far more importantly, though, is the fact that the test is a break from controlling
precedent. The Court attempted to distinguish Easley by finding that politics, as
opposed to race, was the predominant factor and that the case was therefore not
subject to the rules established in Miller v. Johnson30 5 and Bush v. Vera.306 The
Court, however, was only able to distinguish the present case because it found that
large African-American populations were placed into the Twelfth District only
because they were reliably Democrat voters. °7 That amounts to using race "as a
proxy for political characteristics."3 °8 That language indicates that "a racial
stereotype requiring strict scrutiny is in operation." 3"
That being the case, Easley overrules Bush, despite the Court making no mention
of the fact that it is doing so. Beyond that, using race as a proxy for political
characteristics is no less a racial classification than using race for its own sake,
calling for strict scrutiny to be applied." ° In that regard, Easley at the very least
carves out an exception to both Miller v. Johnson3"' and Shaw v. Reno312 for cases
to which the newly created test applies.
But, beyond the question of to which cases the new test applies is the fact that it
is a complete break with anything remotely associated with Equal Protection
jurisprudence. It shifts to the party challenging the constitutionality of a redistricting
scheme the burden of showing "at least that the legislature could have achieved its
legitimate political objectives in alternative ways that are comparably consistent
with traditional districting principles. That party must also show that those
districting alternatives would have brought about significantly greater racial
balance."3" 3
The Court first assumes that the party challenging as unconstitutional the drawing
of its legislative districts will have access to the map-drawing software and printers
necessary to produce alternative districting methods, which generally cost tens of
thousands of dollars, to say nothing of the expertise and experience to do so. More
importantly, though, the Court makes an exception, indeed the only exception, to the
application of strict scrutiny to racial classifications by governmental actors.3" 4 It not
only holds that strict scrutiny does not apply, but actually shifts the burden from the
government, usually required to defend its classification, to the party challenging the
redistricting plan. 5

305. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
306. 517 U.S. 972 (1996) (plurality opinion); 517 U.S. at 999 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
307. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 243.
308. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 968.
309. Id. at 1000 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Cf.Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)
(stating, "Race cannot be a proxy for determining juror bias or competence").
310. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 630(1993).
311. 515 U.S. 900, 900 (1995) (creating "predominant factor" test as application of strict scrutiny to
redistricting cases).
312. 509 U.S. at 630 (applying strict scrutiny to redistricting cases as any other racial classification by a
governmental actor).
313. Easley v. Cromartie,532 U.S. at 258.
314. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
315. Easley v. Cromartie,532 U.S. at 258.
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In that regard, Easley overruled, without acknowledging that it was doing so, a
long line of cases applying the Equal Protection clause to redistricting cases. First,
it overruled Shaw v. Reno, which held a racial gerrymander was a violation of Equal
Protection and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. 31 6 It overruled Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,317 which held that all racial classifications by
governmental actors were subject to strict scrutiny. 318 It overruled Miller v. Johnson,
which applied the Adarand/Shaw standard to redistricting cases and articulated the
"predominant factor" test.3t 9
IV.
The Court's fourth error was political. The Easley majority included Justice
O'Connor, who had voted for all of the decisions overruled by Easley and had
written several of the opinions herself.32
That the Easley decision overruled the precedents discussed in the previous
section is surprising enough. It is all the more surprising when one considers that the
Court was only able to do so because Justice O'Connor voted with the majority,
which included the four Justices commonly thought of as the Court's liberal
members. 321 That, of course, was not itself surprising. Justice O'Connor's position
on the issue, however, was.
Justice O'Connor seemed to recognize that the Court was overstepping its Rule
52 bounds and undertaking its own fact-finding. At oral argument, she went so far
as to ask Walter Dellinger, attorney for the defendant-appellants, "the court below
appears to have believed one expert over another and made findings
that may have
3 22
been within its power to make, and how are we to upset that?
Justice O'Connor is the only member of the current Court who participated in the
redistricting process as a state legislator 23 and represents the deciding fifth vote on
nearly all recent voting rights cases.324 She wrote the Court's opinions in both Shaw
v. Reno,325 a 1993 five-to-four decision, and, less than two years later, in Adarand

316. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 642. Cf Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104 (1986) ("The Equal Protection
Clause prohibits a State from taking any action based on crude, inaccurate racial stereotypes.").
317. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
318. Id. at 227.
319. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 ("The plaintiff's burden is to show, either through circumstantial evidence of
a district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the
predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without
a particular district. To make this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional raceneutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political
subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.").
320. Justice O'Connor wrote the Court's opinions in Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (plurality opinion);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); and Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
321. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg also joined Justice Breyer's opinion.
322. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6.
323. Justice O'Connor was a Republican state senator in 1971 when Arizona, a jurisdiction covered by
Section 5and thus requiring pre-clearance, went through reapportionment. NANCY MAVEETY, JUSTICE SANDRA DAY
O'CONNOR 15 (1996); 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c).
324. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997);
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
325. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.32 6 Just two weeks later, Justice O'Connor joined the
Court's opinion in Miller v. Johnson.327
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote, "To invoke strict scrutiny, a
plaintiff must show that the State has relied on race in substantial disregard of
customary and traditional districting practices." '28 The majority opinion quoted
Justice O'Connor's own opinion in Shaw v. Reno: "But where the State assumes
from a group of voters' race that they 'think alike, share the same political interests,
and will prefer the same candidates at the polls,' it engages in racial stereotyping at
odds with equal protection mandates.3 29
Less than a year after Miller was decided, Justice O'Connor wrote the Court's
plurality opinion in Bush v. Vera. 330 There she wrote, "But to the extent that race is
used as a proxy for political characteristics, a racial stereotype requiring strict
scrutiny is in operation. 3311
Justice O'Connor clearly believed that politics, and not race, was the predominant
factor in drawing the challenged district in Easley. However, the appellant's
argument and the basis of the Court's opinion is that African-American voters were
placed in the Twelfth Congressional District because they were reliable Democrat
voters.332 In other words, race was used as a proxy for political characteristics. In
Justice O'Connor's own words, "a racial stereotype requiring strict scrutiny is in
operation. '3 33
Beyond that, the test that Easley established is a break with Equal Protection
precedent that overrules several cases altogether. In effect, Justice O'Connor voted
to overrule precedent that she had not only voted for but had herself written in the
past eight years. 334 This reversal occurred even after writing in Bush, "[The Court's]
legitimacy requires, above all, that we adhere to stare decisis, especially in such
sensitive political contexts as the present, where partisan controversy abounds....
Our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence evinces a commitment to eliminate
unnecessary and excessive governmental use and reinforcement of racial
'
stereotypes."335
The test established in Easley only applies to cases in which "racial identification
correlates highly with political affiliation, 336 or, put another way, to cases in which
'
"race is used as a proxy for political characteristics."337
How can a single Justice
write an opinion calling for strict scrutiny to be applied in all cases in which race is
used as a proxy for political characteristics, and five years later sign onto an opinion

326. 515 U.S. 200(1995).
327. 515 U.S. 900(1995).
328. 515 U.S. at 928 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
329. Miller, 515 U.S. at 920 (quoting Shaw v. Reno,509 U.S. at 647). Cf Powers, 499 U.S. at 410 ("We may
not accept as a defense to racial discrimination the very stereotype the law condemns.").
330. 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (plurality opinion).
331. 517 U.S. at 968. Cf Powers, 499 U.S. at 410 ("Race cannot be a proxy for determining juror bias or
competence.").
332. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 243.
333. Bush v.Vera, 517 U.S. at 968.
334. See supra Analysis, part III B.
335. Bush v.Vera, 517 U.S. at 985.
336. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 258.
337. Bush v.Vera, 517 U.S. at 968.
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that destroys that precedent and others she has written and allows the use of race as
a proxy?
IMPLICATIONS
I.
The Court's decision in Easley signaled a significant shift in the direction the
substantive law of redistricting had been traveling. In 1993, in the first suit over the
congressional district at issue here, the Court held that the plaintiffs had stated a
claim under the Equal Protection clause by alleging that North Carolina's
redistricting plan was "so irrational on its face that it could be understood only as
an effort to segregate voters on the basis of race., 33 ' In doing so, the Court reversed
the trial court, which had held that the plaintiffs' theory was "a novel claim in voting
rights jurisprudence.. .and we decline to recognize the individual right asserted
339
under it."
This was the Supreme Court's first recognition of so-called reversediscrimination claims in the redistricting context.' Less than three years later the

Court went further, holding that race could not be the primary factor in any

redistricting plan for any reason," including obtaining requisite Department of
Justice pre-clearance or achieving non-retrogression to bring a plan into compliance
with the Voting Rights Act.342
The Court, and thus the law of redistricting in general, was clearly moving toward
requiring "color blind" plans and minimizing the use of race as a factor 3 until the

decision in Easley. Such a trend would have had significant impact in New Mexico

and nationwide, as minority populations comprise an ever-increasing percentage of

the population of this state and nearly every other.
According to Census 2000, Anglos made up just 44.7 percent of New Mexico's

population, the lowest total of any state other than Hawaii.3 New Mexico's
Hispanic population made up 42.1 percent of its total population, the highest

338. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 642.
339. Shaw, v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. at 468.
340. Justice O'Connor expressly denied this claim in the Court's opinion, writing that the "appellants
did not
claim that the General Assembly's reapportionment plan unconstitutionally 'diluted' white voting
strength. They
did not even claim to be white." Shaw v.Reno, 509 U.S. at 641. However, as the Court's citations
J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), to Richmond v.
show, the "reverse
discrimination" line of cases clearly informed the Court's decision and supporting rationale in Shaw.
341. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 959 (plurality opinion); 517 U.S. at 999 (Thomas, J., concurring
in the
judgment).
342. The Court expressly refused to decide whether bringing a redistricting plan into non-retrogression
and
receiving Department of Justice pre-clearance was a compelling state interest for the purposes
of strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection clause in Shaw v.Hunt, 517 U.S. at 902.
343. This trend Justice O'Connor readily admitted. Following the passage cited in note 340, supra,
"Rather, appellants' complaint alleged that the deliberate segregation of voters into separate districts she wrote,
on the basis
of race violated their constitutional right to participate in a 'color-blind' electoral process." Shaw
v.Reno, 509 U.S.
at 641-42.
344. Native Americans made up 8.9 percent of the state's population, African-Americans
Asian-Americans 1.2 percent. Census 2000. Anglos composed 22.9 percent of Hawaii's population.1.7 percent, and
Id. The District
of Columbia (27.8 percent) and Puerto Rico (.9 percent) also had a lesser percentage of Anglo population.
Id.
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Hispanic population percentage in the country 345 and the largest minority percentage
of any state in the country.346 Presently, California is the only other state with a
majority-minority population, 7 but in many states, including New Mexico,
minority groups are the fastest growing portions of the population.348
Nine of New Mexico's thirty-three counties are majority-Hispanic, but the
combined population of those nine is only 382,937.14 1 That is twenty-one percent of
the state's population and an average of 42,549 per county. Moreover, those
counties, like the state's Hispanic population as a whole, are dispersed throughout
the state. Of course, this means that the state's Anglo population is likewise
dispersed throughout the state. Thus, the only way to draw a majority-Hispanic or
majority-minority district is by using race as a districting factor and for its own sake.
The Supreme Court reversed direction with the Easley decision, establishing a
new test for cases "such as this one where majority-minority districts (or the
approximate equivalent) are at issue and where racial identification correlates highly
with political affiliation.... 351 The Court held that in such cases, the "party
attacking the legislatively drawn boundaries must show at the least that the
legislature could have achieved its legitimate political objectives in alternative ways
that are comparably consistent with traditional districting principles. That party must
also show that those districting
alternatives would have brought about significantly
352
greater racial balance.
That test indicates that legislatures may use race as a factor, indeed as the
predominant factor, in drawing majority-minority districts "or the approximate
equivalent" 353 if there is no alternative way to achieve its legitimate political
objectives that are comparably consistent with traditional districting principles. That
test was applied in Easley to a district that was not majority-minority and will
certainly be applied to others in the future.
To that extent it is a break with the decisions in Miller v. Johnson354 and Bush v.
Vera,355 which should have controlled the outcome in this case. 356 Further, the Court
reversed the trend of recent redistricting cases, which had been moving toward
requiring race-neutral redistricting, as well as creating an exception to the rule that

345. Excluding Puerto Rico's 98.8 percent. Id.
346. Excluding Puerto Rico's 98.8 percent Hispanic population and the District of Columbia's sixty-percent
African-American population. Id.
347. "Majority-minority," as used herein, is defined as any state, district, etc., in which minorities make up
more than fifty percent of the total population or, conversely, Anglos comprise less than fifty percent of the total
population. "Minority," as used in this Casenote, refers to any racial, ethnic, or language minority, or generally any
non-Anglo group.
348.

Id.

349. Id.
350. The state's nine majority-Hispanic counties include Mora, Guadalupe, and San Miguel on the eastern
plains; Rio Arriba in the northwest mountains; Dona Ana in the south-central Rio Grande valley; Taos in the northcentral mountains; Luna and Hidalgo in the southwest corner; and Valencia in the central Rio Grande Valley, which
includes much of the rapidly growing Albuquerque suburbs. Id.
351. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. at 258.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. 515 U.S. 900(1995).

355. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
356. See infra note 396 and accompanying text.
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racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny." 7 That exception has no basis in
the Constitution or in Equal Protection jurisprudence.35
I'.
The effect of the Easley decision on New Mexico's redistricting efforts was felt
immediately. The New Mexico legislature met in special session to address
redistricting,359 but only the proposal for the Public Regulation Commission was
signed by the governor.3" The redistricting plans passed for the congressional, state
house and senate, and the state Board of Education districts were all vetoed by the
" ' The
governor.36
legislature later passed a bill redistricting the state senate,362 but the
congressional, state house, and state Board of Education districts were taken to
363

court.

At the trial on the congressional districts, it was widely believed that the presiding
judge would select a moderate plan that included the least-changed districts and that
each party would offer a map that closely resembled the then-existing districts, as
well as each other.36 One group of Democrat plaintiffs, however, instead offered a
radical plan that would have created, for the first time, a majority-Hispanic district
that ran from Albuquerque's North Valley down the Rio Grande corridor to the
Mexican border and included most of the southwestern quadrant of the state.3 65
In the end, Judge Frank Allen indeed selected a plan that closely resembled the
previous districts and whose voter performance numbers indicate that the two
Republican-one Democrat split will likely remain intact for the time being.36 Those
same Democrat plaintiffs, in theory, could have offered a more moderate, less
changed plan whose districts would have hurt Rep. Heather Wilson's (RAlbuquerque) chances of re-election, meaning the delegation's partisan make-up
might have shifted from two Republicans and one Democrat to two Democrats and
one Republican in the near future and had far greater chances of success at trial.367
Instead they chose to support the radical plan that would have created a majorityHispanic district.3"
Those plaintiffs did not argue that Easley supported their plan and allowed the
creation of a majority-Hispanic district despite its use of race as a districting factor
3 9
and its disregard of traditional, race-neutral factorsY.
However, prior to Easley such

357. See supra Analysis, part III B.
358. Id.
359. See supra note 42.
360. Barry Massey, PRC Redistricting GoofMay Help Republicans, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 4, 2001, at D3.
361. David Miles, Governor Vetoes Plans For Districts, ALBUQUERQUE J., Oct. 4, 2001, at D3.
362. Loie Fecteau, Senate OKs 'Status Quo' Redistricting, ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 2, 2002, at A8.

363. Jepsen v. Vigil-Giron, No. D-0101-CV-2001-02177 (2001) (deciding both U.S. House and state house
districts); Sanchez v. Vigil-Giron, No. D-001-CV-2001-02250 (2001).
364. See, e.g., Loie Fecteau, Skeen Re-Election PlansRemain a PoliticalMystery, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 6,
2002, at B2; David Miles, Gov. Wants 'FairShake'forGOP,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 26, 2001, at B3; Loie Fecteau,
Johnson Backs Off Map Veto Threat, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 12, 2001.
365. Jepsen v. Vigil-Giron, No. D-101-CV-200102177 (2001).
366. Id. See also Loie Fecteau, Duke City Keeps District I, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 3, 2002, at Al.
367. See Deborah Baker, Hispanics Key to Dem Map, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 13, 2001, at D3.
368.

See Loie Fecteau, Dems' Remap Plan Supported, ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 12,2001, at B3.

369. See Jepsen v. Vigil-Giron, No. D-101-CV-200102177 (2001).
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a plan would have had no basis in law and no argument to support its adoption.37 °
It is likely that Easley was behind the plaintiffs supporting the plan they created.
IlL.
Had Easley been decided the other way, the redistricting process would still run
roughshod over the principles of republican democracy. There can hardly be an
argument that racial classifications are not despicable and have a divisive effect on
politics, not to mention on life in general. However, removing the racial
gerrymander from the redistricting scenery leaves in place the partisan gerrymander
and the political and legal battles, fought at taxpayer expense, that come with it.
Most congressional elections are decided, and will continue to be decided, in state
legislatures once every ten years, often based on nothing more than which party
happens to be in control at that moment in time.
The Court has held that partisan gerrymanders can give rise to Equal Protection
claims,37 ' though they seldom do. Even when a legal challenge or the political
process dictates partisan impartiality, partisan gerrymanders are replaced with
bipartisan gerrymanders whose only purpose is to protect incumbents. As was the
case in Easley,372 a sufficiently detailed demographic analysis can reveal the manner
in which a district must be drawn in order to elect nearly any candidate.
Sophisticated policy debates have disappeared from our campaigns and elections.
It takes time to prepare and deliver an answer to a difficult question and those silent
seconds do not play well on television, which we, as a nation, seem to be unable to
do without. Instead of finding another way to engage our candidates for political
office, we, as a society and a political culture, have instead ceased asking difficult
questions.
There was a time when debates among candidates for public office took place on
the courthouse steps and lasted all of Sunday afternoon. Now we, as a society and
a political culture, settle for a thirty-second sound bite and choose the most attractive
smile because we can't be bothered to devote any more time or effort to
participating in our government.
The very basis of any system of democracy, whether direct or representative, is
that the people participate and have a voice in their government. In our republican
system, the people do this by choosing their representatives. The redistricting system
that has evolved has turned these precepts on their head, and our system of
government has become the polar opposite of what it was intended to be. "The final
result seems not one in which the people select their representatives, but in which
the representatives have selected the people. 373
Citizens who understand the redistricting process should be outraged by the way
it operates. Legislators who understand how voters operate have every reason to
hide behind that process. And the cycle continues.

370. See Bush v. Vera, 515 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
371. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
372. See supra Analysis, part II A.
373. Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1334 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd sub noma.
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952
(1996).
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court committed four errors in deciding Easley. The first was
procedural. The Court misapplied the clear error standard required by Rule 52(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It abused its role as a reviewing court and
overstepped its bounds in undertaking its own fact-finding. The Court apparently did
not like the trial court's decision, so it did what it had to do to reverse it, including
ignoring precedent and rules of procedure.
The second error was substantive. The Court, because it sought to determine the
facts of the case as described above, either misunderstood or ignored much of the
plaintiffs' evidence. As the district court found at trial, ample evidence existed to
support the finding that race was the predominant factor in drawing the district.
North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District was racially gerrymandered and
should have been struck down as a violation of Equal Protection.
The third error was jurisprudential. Without announcing it was doing so, the
Court overruled Miller v. Johnson374 and Bush v. Vera," 5 as well as the
accompanying decade-long trend toward color-blind redistricting. The new test the
Court announced has no basis in either the Constitution or the Court's own Equal
Protection jurisprudence. It carves out an exception to the racial discrimination rule
that will be exploited for the foreseeable future.
The fourth error was political. The Court's majority somehow convinced Justice
O'Connor to vote for a decision that flew in the face of, and in fact overruled, not
only controlling decisions, but controlling decisions that she had written. Her
positions on redistricting issues are a complete mystery, and her voting record on
recent cases is inexplicable.
Easley represents judicial activism at its worst. The Court never should have
reached the merits of the appeal. Its inquiry should have ended once it established
that the trial court's decision was not clearly erroneous. Once the Court did reach
the merits of the appeal, it never should have reversed the lower court's opinion. The
evidence supporting the trial court's decision was abundant. Once the Court reversed
the trial court, it never should have created a new test for future cases. Easley
created new law in derogation of decades of Equal Protection jurisprudence.
Finally, the Court had before it the sort of case that would have allowed it to
make a moral statement and set an example for the nation. It had before it a clear-cut
case of voters being placed into a particular congressional district because of their
race. The Court could have said that racial classifications have no place in this legal
system, in this country, in a civilized society. Instead, it turned a blind eye and
allowed them to continue, so long as five Justices who do not want to believe they
exist can be convinced that they are not really there.
The Easley decision gives the sanction of the Supreme Court to the use of race
as a factor, indeed the predominant factor, in drawing new districts so long as it is
cloaked as party affiliation. In other words, the Supreme Court has allowed people
to be segregated according to their race for the purposes of redistricting. What then
374. 515 U.S. 900(1995).
375. 515 U.S. 952 (1996).
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is the difference between drawing a congressional or legislative district for people
of a certain race only because of their race and giving those same people their own
schools, or restrooms, or water fountains only because of their race? Only the fact
that the minority group will ostensibly benefit from being segregated into its own
district.
Since its creation, the Supreme Court has held a unique position in our legal and
political system. It has had, throughout its history, opportunities to create law, lead
society, and set examples. Since 1954, it has set an example in the area of race
relations 376 and accepted the responsibility of acting as the moral compass for our
nation and its legal system. Because it has the opportunity and ability to do so, the
Court has the duty to act in that capacity when possible. Easley presented just such
an opportunity. The case provided the Court with an occasion to make a social,
political, and moral statement.
What neither the district court nor the Supreme Court addressed is the fact that
the North Carolina General Assembly enacted racial discrimination. Whether
African-Americans were targeted and placed into the Twelfth District because they
were African-American or because they were Democrats, whether they were placed
in the district for their benefit or for their detriment, is positively irrelevant. All that
matters is that they were placed in the district. They were subject to a racial
classification. Such a classification,
regardless of its intent or result, is per se
377
constitutionally suspect.
Racial classifications "are by their very nature odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. '' 371 "This rule obtains with
equal force regardless of 'the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification.' 379 Racial classifications by governmental actors are alone sufficient
to trigger strict scrutiny. 380 "A racial classification, regardless of purported
motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary
justification. ' 381 "Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes
among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the
38 2
law.

There is no exception for redistricting decisions, and the same principles apply
despite the difficulty of the task of determining whether voters were placed into
districts based upon their race.383 This is true not only for explicit racial

376. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
377. Id. See also Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Kennedy, J.J.) ("We thus reaffirm the view expressed by the plurality in Wygant
[v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. at 279-801 that the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a paiticular classification."); Croson, 488 U.S. at 520
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I agree...with Justice O'Connor's conclusion that strict scrutiny must be
applied to all governmental classifications by race, whether or not its asserted purpose or design is 'remedial' or
'benign."').
378. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
379. Miller, 515 U.S. at 904 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 494).
380. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
381. Brown, 347 U.S. at483.
382. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
383. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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classifications but also for facially neutral laws that are "unexplainable on grounds
other than race," 3" including "redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face
that it is 'unexplainable on grounds other than race,'" 38 5 which "demand[s] the same
386
close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race.9
Shaw v. Reno made clear that a state may not racially segregate its citizens into
388
38
voting districts any more than it may segregate them in its public parks, buses,
golf courses, 389 beaches, 39 or schools.39 Having done so, Miller v. Johnson then
articulated the now-famous (or notorious, depending on one's point of view)
"predominant factor test. ' ' 39 1While this test has been argued to require some
higher
standard of challenges to redistricting legislation,393 it was merely the Court's
expression of the strict scrutiny standard as applied to redistricting cases.3"
How the Court, or anyone else, could possibly presume that a racial classification
such as the one that occurred in North Carolina should remain undisturbed because
it was undertaken on behalf of the African-American community of the Piedmont
area is inexplicable. That the Court, or anyone else, could possibly believe that a
racial classification
that allegedly protects the interests of African-Americans is less
"odious ' 395 than any other is preposterous.
In deciding Easley, the Court could have held that racial classifications simply
will not be tolerated under any circumstances. It could have held that regardless of
who attempts to undertake them, regardless of why they do so, regardless of what
groups they apply to, racial classifications by governmental actors are subject to
strict scrutiny. As that was the law when the case was decided, 39 the Court needed
only to apply controlling precedent in order to eradicate the use of race in
redistricting.
There is no justification for the use of race that the Court sees fit to allow to
continue after Easley. Instead of accepting, even embracing, its law-making role, the
Court hid behind and improperly applied its error-correcting role, and in doing so
was derelict in its duty to the legal system and to American society. Instead of

384. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
385. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 644 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266).
386. Id.
387. New Orleans City Park Improv. Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam).
388. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam).
389. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam).
390. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam).
391. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
392. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 ("The plaintiffs burden is to show, either through circumstantial evidence of
a district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the
predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without
a particular district. To make this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional raceneutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political
subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.").
393. See, e.g., Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001)
(Nos. 99-1864, 99-1865).
394. Miller, 515 U.S. at 915 ("To the extent any of the opinions in [United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh,
Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977)] can be interpreted as suggesting that a State's assignment of voters on the basis
of race would be subject to anything but our strictest scrutiny, those views ought not to be deemed controlling.").
395. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
396. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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making a moral statement, the Court averted its collective eyes. Instead of
reaffirming the principle, previously believed self-evident, that all people are created
equal,397 it consented to treating them unequally, based only upon their race.
The Easley decision is no less divisive or discriminatory than any poll tax or
literacy test that forty years of voting rights jurisprudence and civil rights struggle
have sought to eradicate. It does nothing more than enact hate into law. It holds that
because a group of people looks different and comes from a different place it should
be treated differently. It ignores the fact that separating people into different
congressional districts on the basis of their race is only one step removed from
separating them with fire hoses and police dogs on the streets of Montgomery. It not
only defies logic; it destroys faith, flouts hope, extinguishes love.398 It not only has
no basis in the Constitution or Equal Protection jurisprudence; it has no basis in
American tradition, history, or the Judeo-Christian experience.
The division of people based upon nothing more than the color of their skin is the
sort of repugnant hatred that people in this country have fought against for centuries.
The use of race as a proxy for political, or any other, characteristics is the very
definition of racism.3 More remarkable than the fact that racism still exists is that
it need be discussed in a publication such as this one because it is practiced in
government at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Just as remarkable is that any
person of any race would, under any circumstance, argue that dividing people by
their race would benefit their group.
In an enlightened society, no party should be heard to argue for racial or ethnic
segregation because it suits its purposes. In a civilized society, no party should be
heard to argue for racial or ethnic segregation under any circumstances. Yet, one
hundred thirty-six years after the end of the Civil War, one hundred thirty-three
years after slavery was prohibited forever, and forty-seven years after the Supreme
Court bravely held that "separate but equal" was inherently unequal,' a majority
of the Court voted to re-legalize segregation. The only winner in this case was hate.
The first sentence of this Casenote's Historical Background section stated that
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution requires that representatives be apportioned
according to population and that each state have one representative. Of course, that
Section originally read, "Representatives... shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective
Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free
Persons.. .three fifths of all other Persons.""tf Our Founding Fathers, despite the
racial ignorance common to that period, had the foresight to include in the
Constitution a provision allowing for its amendment. Unfortunately, Supreme Court
precedents have no such provision. Alas, constitutional law has come full circle.

397. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
398. See I Corinthians 13:1-13.
399. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 962 (10th ed. 1995) ("Racism: A belief that race is the
primary determinant of human traits and capacities.").
400. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
401. U.S. CONST.art. I,§ 2.

